What we have already determined is the process hasn't been audited for quite some time.
They have already asked for 2 extentions out to 19th October. One cannot help but be suspicious of this delayed answering.
We have asked the Attorney General to initiate a audit of the Electoral system, to date we have had no indication that this has been followed up.
We have a system that has no credibility.
Will your vote make a difference?
OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT REQUEST
Subject:
Electoral Roll Integrity, Audit, Verification, and Democratic Risk
Sent:
31 July 2026
From:
105 Office / LandsAirWater
To:
Electoral Commission
By email:
[email protected]
This was a request under the Official Information Act 1982.
The request concerned the integrity, maintenance, audit, verification, and governance of the New Zealand electoral roll. It was made because electoral roll accuracy is central to public confidence in electoral administration and democratic governance.
The request sought information about:
1. Electoral roll audit and verification records
Records concerning any audit, review, verification, assurance, or quality-control process applied to the New Zealand electoral roll during the last five years, including independent audits, internal audits, assurance reports, data integrity reviews, roll accuracy assessments, error-rate analyses, and post-election roll integrity reviews.
2. Independent verification
Records showing whether any independent body, contractor, auditor, agency, or external reviewer verifies the integrity or accuracy of the electoral roll.
If no independent verification is undertaken, records explaining why internal monitoring is considered sufficient, including any risk assessments, governance consideration, or legal, operational, or policy advice.
3. Electoral roll error rates and data integrity
Records from the last five years concerning known or estimated error rates in the electoral roll, including duplicate entries, deceased persons remaining on the roll, incorrect enrolments, outdated enrolments, missing enrolments, altered enrolments, address errors, identity-matching errors, data-matching issues, and system-generated or manually identified anomalies.
4. Processes for identifying and correcting errors
Records describing the Commission's processes for identifying, investigating, correcting, and recording electoral roll errors, including policies, procedures, workflow records, internal guidance, escalation rules, exception reports, quality-assurance steps, and records showing how corrections are approved and audited.
5. Technical issues affecting electoral roll or voting records
Records from the last five years concerning technical issues, system faults, data-transfer issues, integration issues, database problems, or operational incidents affecting electoral roll records, enrolment records, voter records, vote-tracking records, special vote processing, roll mark-off or reconciliation processes, or any system used to maintain, verify, update, or reconcile roll information.
6. Complaint handling
Records from the last five years showing the number and nature of complaints received about voting irregularities, missing enrolments, altered enrolments, duplicate enrolments, incorrect enrolments, deceased persons on the roll, roll accuracy, vote-tracking issues, or any other complaint category relating to electoral roll integrity.
The request also sought records showing how those complaints were logged, categorised, investigated, escalated, resolved, reported internally, and reviewed for systemic issues.
7. Governance, risk, and oversight records
Board, executive, governance, risk, management, or operational oversight records concerning electoral roll integrity during the last five years, including Board papers, Board minutes, executive leadership papers, risk-register entries, internal reports, assurance reports, post-election reviews, lessons-learned records, legal advice summaries where releasable, management decisions, and records concerning whether the current system provides sufficient assurance of roll accuracy.
8. Records relied upon for public assurance
Records the Commission relies upon when assuring the public, Ministers, Parliament, candidates, parties, or other agencies that the electoral roll is accurate, complete, lawful, and fit for electoral use.
9. Records not held
If any requested record does not exist, the Commission was asked to identify the specific class of information not held, whether it never existed or was destroyed or disposed of, the business units searched, the systems and locations searched, the search terms and criteria used, and whether the information is held by another agency, contractor, auditor, or service provider.
10. Transfer
If any part of the request is more closely connected with another agency, contractor, auditor, or service provider, the Commission was asked to transfer that part under section 14 of the Official Information Act and advise of the transfer.
The request asked for the information electronically.
It also asked that if any part was refused, the Commission identify the statutory ground relied upon, the information being refused, the search undertaken, and the reasoning for the refusal.
If information was withheld, the Commission was asked to provide a schedule identifying the document, date, author or business unit where known, general subject matter, and withholding ground relied upon.
Signed:
Michael Clark
LandsAirWater