The Government had an online COVID-19 monitoring system.

WE REVIEW THE CROWN | ISAYSO.NET Page 1

WE REVIEW THE CROWN

ISAYSO.NET

WHO PROVED IT?

The Government had an online COVID-19 monitoring system. The unanswered

question is whether the claims labelled “misinformation”, “disinformation” or “online

harm” were proved by a transparent evidential process.

CLAIM IT. PROVE IT. SHOW THE AUTHORITY. SHOW THE MONEY.

Official records establish that government agencies monitored and reported on the online

COVID-19 information environment. DPMC records refer to an interagency disinformation and online

harms group, an Insights and Reporting function, and contracted reporting concerning online harms

and threats against the COVID-19 response.

That establishes the existence of a monitoring and reporting system. It does not, by itself, prove that

every statement or person classified within that system was accurately characterised.

The central evidential question is therefore simple:

WHEN THE CROWN SAID SOMETHING WAS FALSE –

WHAT WAS THE PROOF?

This newsletter sets out the questions now being put to the Crown under the Official Information Act

1982.

Focus Proof, funding, definition of harm, information sharing and accountability.

Standard Evidence first. No predetermined conclusion.

Request A focused OIA seeking the methodology, records and accountability chain.

WE REVIEW THE CROWN | ISAYSO.NET Page 2

A complaint is not proof

A report from a member of the public proves that a complaint was made. It does not automatically

prove that the underlying statement was false.

If government subsequently represents a statement as misinformation, disinformation, false

information or an online harm, there should be a traceable evidential pathway:

1 ORIGINAL CLAIM

2 EVIDENCE EXAMINED

3 FACTUAL / SCIENTIFIC TEST

4 FINDING

5 DECISION-MAKER

6 QUALITY ASSURANCE

7 CORRECTION IF WRONG

The OIA asks DPMC to produce the methodology and standard used at each of those stages –

including how scientific uncertainty and disagreement were handled.

The point is not that every government classification was necessarily wrong. The point is that a

classification is still a claim, and a claim should be capable of verification.

Voluntary vaccination and lawful disagreement

Different kinds of conduct must be kept separate. A person could decline vaccination, question a

mandate, challenge vaccine-pass policy, ask about transmission, or criticise lockdowns without

necessarily disseminating false information.

LAWFUL DISAGREEMENT IS NOT, BY ITSELF, PROOF OF

DISINFORMATION.

The OIA therefore asks what process distinguished lawful dissent from a demonstrably false factual

assertion, and whether officials were required to identify the precise statement said to be false before

applying a label.

WE REVIEW THE CROWN | ISAYSO.NET Page 3

What did “harm” mean?

One of the important issues is the breadth of the concept of “harm”. Official material referred to

reporting on online harms and threats against the COVID-19 response.

Some forms of harm are straightforward: threats, incitement to violence, or dangerous deception may

present obvious risks. But the accountability question becomes different if “harm” also extended to

reduced confidence in government, opposition to mandates, protest, non-compliance, or criticism of

policy.

WAS “HARM” HARM TO PEOPLE – OR HARM TO THE

ACCEPTANCE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY?

The OIA asks DPMC to provide the operative definition of harm and to state whether the concept

included:

• reduced vaccination uptake

• opposition to mandates or vaccine passes

• reduced compliance with government policy

• criticism of government

• loss of confidence in government

• anti-authority sentiment or reduced “social cohesion”

The answer matters because public health communications and state monitoring are not the same

function. A government can advocate for its policy. A separate question arises if criticism of that policy

is itself treated as evidence of harm.

Follow the money

DPMC has released material concerning contracts and projects associated with disinformation

monitoring. Public funding does not prove bias or misconduct. It does, however, create a

straightforward public-accountability question:

WHAT WAS PURCHASED, HOW WAS ACCURACY MEASURED, AND

WHO CHECKED THE WORK?

The OIA seeks contract values, scopes of work, deliverables, performance measures, procurement

records and the identity of the government official responsible for verifying the accuracy of externally

supplied reporting.

WE REVIEW THE CROWN | ISAYSO.NET Page 4

Who received the information?

Monitoring becomes more consequential if information about identifiable individuals, accounts or

organisations moves beyond a communications team and into enforcement or intelligence systems.

The request therefore asks which agencies received COVID-19 misinformation, disinformation or

online-harms reporting, and whether identifiable information could be included.

NZ Police Was monitoring information supplied to Police or Police intelligence functions?

NZSIS / GCSB Was information shared with intelligence agencies?

Ministry of Health What information moved between public-health and monitoring functions?

CERT NZ / DIA What reporting or referral pathways existed?

Firearms / enforcement Could online classifications affect later risk, licensing or enforcement assessments?

No conclusion should be drawn merely from the existence of interagency contact. The purpose of the

OIA is to establish what was actually shared, under what authority, and with what safeguards.

Who was accountable if it was wrong?

A functioning accountability system needs more than a person who can make a classification. It also

needs a person or institution responsible for correcting it.

• Who authorised the monitoring?

• Who approved the methodology?

• Who checked the evidential basis?

• Who audited the work?

• Could an affected person find out they had been classified?

• Could they challenge an inaccurate assessment?

• Were downstream agencies notified when information was corrected?

• What remedy existed if an incorrect classification caused an adverse consequence?

WHO WATCHED THE WATCHERS?

WE REVIEW THE CROWN | ISAYSO.NET Page 5

Did the COVID-19 Royal Commission examine this

machinery?

The COVID-19 Royal Commission examined major aspects of the response. But that does not

automatically establish that it conducted a forensic audit of every online-monitoring programme, every

misinformation classification, every funding relationship, or every interagency information-sharing

pathway.

The OIA therefore asks DPMC a narrow question: were these matters substantively examined?

• the online monitoring programme itself

• the evidential basis for misinformation/disinformation classifications

• government funding of external monitoring organisations

• sharing of identifiable information with Police or intelligence agencies

• accountability for incorrect classifications and correction mechanisms

If they were examined, the Crown should identify the evidence and findings. If they were not, that is

itself an important answer.

What We Review the Crown is asking for

The OIA is deliberately focused. It does not demand every COVID-19 document or every social-media

post. It asks for the rules of the system and the records that show whether the rules were

followed.

PROOF What evidence had to exist before a claim was labelled false?

HARM What did government mean by online harm?

MONEY Who was funded, for what, and against what performance measures?

SHARING Which agencies received reports or identifiable information?

ACCOUNTABILITY Who was responsible when an assessment was wrong?

OVERSIGHT Was this machinery independently audited or substantively examined by the Royal

Commission?

THE PURPOSE OF THE OIA IS NOT TO PRE-JUDGE THE ANSWER. IT

IS TO MAKE THE ANSWER TESTABLE.

If the Crown has a documented, rigorous and independently reviewed process, it should be able to

produce that evidence. If the evidence trail is incomplete, that is equally important for the public record.

WE REVIEW THE CROWN | ISAYSO.NET Page 6

The standard

CLAIM IT. PROVE IT. SHOW THE AUTHORITY. SHOW THE

MONEY. SHOW THE OVERSIGHT. CORRECT IT IF IT WAS

WRONG.

That standard should apply to members of the public. It should also apply to the

Crown.

Sources and official records

1. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet – Responses to Official Information Act requests concerning the COVID-19

interagency disinformation and online harms group and related COVID-19 reporting.

2. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet – COVID-19 Response Weekly Report, 17 December 2021, including discussion

of the online “false information landscape”.

3. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet – OIA material concerning The Disinformation Project / Te Punaha Matatini

contracts and reporting on online harms and threats against the COVID-19 response.

4. Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons and subsequent government material concerning the scope and findings

of the inquiry.

Editorial note: This newsletter distinguishes between matters established by official records and matters that remain

questions for disclosure. It does not assume that any particular classification, person or agency acted unlawfully.

WE REVIEW THE CROWN

Isayso.net

Evidence first. Accountability always.

not a lawyer