The Treasury Clawback, Disgorgement, or Recovery Mechanisms
OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT 1982 REQUEST
Requester: InLandsAirWater Counsel (correspondence address on file)
Date: today being the 3rd of February 2026
To: The Treasury
Request under the Official Information Act 1982
This
request is made under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA). It is
made in good faith and seeks information necessary to understand
public-sector oversight, enforcement economics, and fiscal exposure
relating to financial-market misconduct.
Information requested
1. Enforcement Economics / Cost–Benefit Analysis
Any
analysis, modelling, advice, or briefing held by the Treasury
(including draft or internal documents) that considers whether financial
institutions may rationally repeat market misconduct where penalties,
settlements, or fines are materially lower than the profits generated by
that misconduct.
2. Clawback, Disgorgement, or Recovery Mechanisms
All
documents describing Treasury’s role (if any) in clawback,
disgorgement, recovery, or fiscal treatment of penalties, settlements,
or fines imposed on financial institutions for market manipulation or
related misconduct, including:
• whether recovered sums are netted against gains;
• whether Treasury assesses deterrence effectiveness;
• whether repeat-offence risk is evaluated.
3. Inter-agency Oversight and Accountability
Communications, guidance, or memoranda between Treasury and any regulator or enforcement body concerning:
• adequacy of penalties as deterrence;
• repeat-offender risk;
• market integrity and systemic risk implications.
4. International Coordination / Awareness
Any
briefings or awareness held by Treasury regarding overseas enforcement
actions for precious-metals or commodities market manipulation, and
whether such actions informed New Zealand policy, risk assessments, or
regulatory posture.
5. Fiscal Exposure and Public Interest
Any
assessment of fiscal, market, or public-interest exposure where
enforcement outcomes allow misconduct to remain economically rational
for large institutions.
Administrative matters
• If
any part of this request is refused, please specify the precise
statutory ground relied upon and provide the public-interest balancing
considered.
• Where information is withheld, please provide a schedule describing the document and the basis for withholding.
• Electronic copies are preferred.
To: The Office of the Auditor-General
Request under the Official Information Act 1982
This
request seeks information relating to the Auditor-General’s
consideration of deterrence, value-for-money, and effectiveness of
enforcement regimes where penalties may be treated as a cost of doing
business.
Information requested
1. Audit or Assurance Work
Any
audits, inquiries, assurance reviews, or scoping documents that
consider whether penalties and settlements for financial-market
misconduct provide effective deterrence or value for money.
2. Systemic Risk and Repeat Behaviour
Any
analysis or correspondence assessing whether enforcement settings
permit repeat misconduct because penalties are materially lower than
profits.
3. Treasury Interaction
Communications between the Auditor-General and Treasury concerning:
• enforcement economics;
• deterrence effectiveness;
• clawback or recovery of gains;
• systemic market integrity risk.
4. Standards and Benchmarks
Any
standards, benchmarks, or criteria used by the Auditor-General when
assessing whether enforcement outcomes protect the public interest and
fiscal integrity.
Administrative matters
• If information is refused, please identify the statutory ground and any public-interest considerations applied.
• Please provide documents electronically where possible.
Purpose and context
The
purpose of these requests is to understand whether public institutions
have assessed, or are assessing, the risk that enforcement regimes may
fail to deter repeated market misconduct because penalties are
economically rational to absorb. This is a matter of public confidence,
fiscal stewardship, and market integrity.
Signature:
Tracy lynch
Under instructions from the trustees